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Apostoledes argued that the State would 
be precluded from a retrial because to 
do so would force the State to prove 
conduct for which she was previously 
tried. [d. at 1123. However, the court 
of appeals stated, " [n]owhere in its 
opinion did the Grady Court suggest 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause pro-
tects against multiple trials when one 
or more counts are left unresolved 
following an initial trial due to jury 
deadlock, the grant of a new trial, or 
reversal on appeal." [d. at 1123. The 
court asserted, rather, that the holding 
in Grady applied to cases in which the 
State failed to bring and join for trial 
all charges arising from a single epi-
sode in a single proceeding. By ini-
tially bringing all criminal charges 
against Ms. Apostoledes in a single 
proceeding, the State conformed ex-
actly to Grady's new double jeopardy 
" same conduct" test, thereby avoid-
ing the double jeopardy problems at 
issue in Grady. [d. 
Judge McAuliffe concurred in the 
ruling with the exception of the 
majority's interpretation of double 
jeopardy in Grady. He opined that the 
Supreme Court did not limit Grady to 
successive prosecutions only, but may 
have intended it to apply to multiple 
punishments as well. Finding the 
Blockberger "same offense" test a 
rather sterile approach, McAuliffe 
stated, "[t]he Grady modification 
utilizes a case-oriented approach, add-
ing flesh to the bare bones of each 
essential element the conduct used to 
prove that element, and then compar-
ing the list of elements so defined." 
[d. at 1124 (citing Blockberger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)). 
He concluded, though, that even if 
Grady did apply to multiple punish-
ments, the result in this case would not 
have changed because conspiracy and 
murder are not the same offense. 593 
A.2d at 1126. 
In its review of double jeopardy 
challenges, the court ruled that former 
jeopardy /acquittal, collateral estoppel, 
and the recent Grady" same conduct" 
test did not preclude the State from 
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retrying the case for second degree 
murder despite a prior conspiracy ac-
quittal. This decision is significant as 
it gives the State the opportunity for a 
retrial in cases of acquittal or jury 
deadlock and provides insight into 
how Grady should be interpreted. 
- Karl Phillips 
Chisom v. Roemer: JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS COVERED WITIllN 
MEANING OF "REPRESENTA-
TIVES" IN VOTERS' RIGHTS 
ACT. 
The Supreme Court of the United 
States settled a statutory interpretation 
conflict among federal courts of ap-
peals in deciding Chisom v. Roemer, 
111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991). In Chisom, 
the Supreme Court held that the use of 
the term" representatives" in the Vot-
ers' Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 
1982, covers judicial elections as well 
as legislative elections. This holding 
overturned the interpretation of Sec-
tion 2 by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
The petitioners in Chisom repre-
sented a class of approximately 135,000 
African-American registered voters in 
Orleans Parish, Louisiana. The peti-
tioners brought their suit against vari-
ous state elected officials challenging 
the electoral process of judges to the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana. 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana 
consists of seven members. Two are 
elected from one multi-member su-
preme court district. The remaining 
five members are elected in single-
member supreme court districts. The 
one multi-member district consists of 
four parishes, one of which is the 
Orleans Parish. In the Orleans Parish 
more than one-half of the registered 
voters are African-American, whereas 
three-fourths of the registered voters 
in the other three parishes are white. 
The petitioners alleged that the 
Louisiana method of electing judges 
impermissibly diluted the voting 
strength of African-Americans in vio-
lationofSection2 of the Voters Rights 
Act of 1965 by broadening the popu-
lace of voters, thus frustrating efforts 
by African-Americans to elect an Af-
rican-American judge. [d. The United 
States District Court for the District of 
Louisiana dismissed the petitioners' 
claim holding that judges are not" rep-
resentatives," and thus judicial elec-
tions are not covered under Section 2 
of the Voters' Rights Act. [d. at 2359. 
On appeal, the court of appeals 
reversed and remanded the case find-
ing that the term "representatives" 
within the Voters' Rights Act included 
anyone elected by a popular election 
from a field of candidates. The court 
thus held that judges were included 
within the meaning of " representa-
tives." [d. On remand the district 
court concluded that insufficient evi-
dence existed to establish a violation 
of Section 2 of the Voters' Rights Act 
and the petitioners appealed once again 
to the court of appeals. [d. at 2360. 
Following the en banc decision in a 
similar case, the court of appeals re-
manded Chisom, and the petitioners 
appealed. [d. at 2361. 
While the petitioners' appeal was 
pending, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit decided League o/United 
Latin-American Citizens Council v. 
Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (1990) (here-
inafter "LULAC"), a case similar to 
Chisom involving the interpretation 
of "representative" within Section 2 
of the Voters' Rights Act of 1965. 
Chisom, 111 S. Ct. 2360. TheLULAC 
court reasoned that, because public 
opinion is irrelevant in the role of the 
judiciary, judges do not serve in a 
representative capacity and are not 
included within the meaning of " rep-
resentative" in interpreting Section 2 
of the Voters' Rights Act. [d. 
The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari arid consolidated LULA C and 
Chisom for determining the test to be 
applied in deciding whether a viola-
tion of the Voters' Rights Act of 1965 
exists in judicial and other elections. 
[d. at 2362. 
The Court began its analysis by 
setting out the text of Section 2 of the 
Voters' Rights Act of 1965 as amended 
in 1982. The Act in part states that, 
[a] violation ... is established 
if, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, it is shown that 
the political processes leading 
to nomination or election in 
the State or political subdivi-
sion are not equally open to 
participation by members of a 
class of citizens ... in that its 
members have less opportu-
nity than other members of 
the electorate to participate in 
the political process and to 
elect 'representatives' of their 
choice. 
Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2364 (quoting 
Voters' Rights Act of 1965, §2(b), as 
amended, 42 U .S.C.A. 1973). 
The Court then reviewed LULA C 
and rejected the respondent's claim 
that Congress' use of the word" repre-
sentatives" in Section 2(b) of the Vot-
ers' Rights Act was evidence of con-
gressional intent to exclude judicial 
elections from coverage. [d. at 2364. 
The Court noted the LULAC court's 
distinction of Section 2(b) providing 
two separate protections of minority 
voting rights. [d. 
The Court reasoned that the LULA C 
majority created two tests. One test 
was to be applied when the right of 
individuals to participate in the politi-
cal process was frustrated, such as by 
time and location disincentives that 
result in depriving a class of people of 
the opportunity to vote. [d. at 2365. 
The second part of the LULAC Sec-
tion 2(b) test involved the denial of the 
voters' "opportunity to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice. " [d. at 2364 
(quoting LULAC, 914 F.2d at 625.) 
In rejecting the dual reading of 
Section 2(b), the Court reasoned that 
to substitute the word "or" for the 
word " and" in interpreting Section 2 
would destroy the plain meaning of 
the sentence. [d. at 2365. The Court 
determined that such a radical recon-
struction would be necessary to sepa-
rate the opportunity to participate in 
the political process from the opportu-
nity to elect representatives. [d. 
The Court referred to its analysis 
in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 
(1973) and Whitcombv. Chavis, 403 
U.S. 124 (1971) in identifying the 
language from which Section 2 is 
patterned. Chisom, 110 S. Ct. at 
2365. In both of these cases, the Court 
found the opportunity to participate in 
the political process inextricably con-
nected to the opportunity to elect rep-
resentatives. [d. 
The Court opined that further sup-
port for their interpretation of "repre-
sentatives" as including judicial elec-
tions was evidenced by Congress' 
replacing the word " legislators" with 
" representatives" when adopting the 
language of the Court in White v. 
Regester. Chisom, 110S. Ct. at 2366. 
The Court reasoned that the substitu-
Chisom is also important as it repre-
sents the Court's continuation of the 
liberal application of the test for find-
ing a violation of the Voters' Rights 
Act of 1965. 
- Daryl D. Jones 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine: 
ABSENT MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
STATEMENT'S MEANING, DE-
LIBERATE ALTERATION OF 
SPEAKER'S WORDS BY AUTHOR 
NOT ACTUAL MALICE. 
In Masson v. New Yorker Maga-
zine, 111 S.Ct. 2419 (1991), the United 
States Supreme Court held that an 
author's alteration of a speaker's state-
ments did not amount to actual malice 
for defamation purposes unless such 
an alteration resulted in a material 
tion of" representatives" for" legisla- change in the statement's meaning. 
tors" indicates that Congress intended Thus, the Court rejected the argument 
the phrase to cover more than legisla- that any alteration of a speaker's words 
tive elections. [d. beyond those made for grammar or 
The Court next likened the inclu- syntax proved knowledge offalsity or 
sion of sheriffs, prosecutors, state reckless disregard for the truth. 
treasurers, and other elected officials Plaintiff, Jeffrey Masson, claimed 
chosen by popular elections as "repre- he was defamed by article author Janet 
sentatives" to judges who are chosen Malcolm when she used quotation 
by popular elections. [d. The Court marks to attribute to Masson com-
determined that the word" representa- ments he alleged he did not make. 
tive" refers to someone who prevails Malcolm interviewed Masson, a noted 
in a popular election, within which psychoanalyst and former Projects 
judicial elections exist. [d. Director of the Sigmund Freud Ar-
Lastly, the Court found their in- chives, for an article she was writing 
terpretation of Section 2 consistent about him for The New Yorker maga-
with the broad remedial purpose of zine. Prior to the publication of the 
ridding the country of racial discrimi- article, Masson expressed concern to 
nation in voting, upon which the Vot- the fact-checking department of the 
ers' Rights Act of 1965 was enacted. magazine about a number of errors in 
[d. at 2368. In applying the Voters' several passages. Despite these con-
Rights Act, the Court noted its policy cerns, the article appeared in the maga-
statement in Allen v. State Board of zine as a two-part series in 1983, and 
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), pro- in 1984 Respondent, AlfredA. Knopf, 
viding that the Act should be broadly Inc., published the entire series as a 
read to combat discrimination. book. 
Chisom, 110 S. Ct. at 2368. 
The decision in Chisom is signifi-
cant as it disallows race based voter 
dilution or "gerrymandering" of elec-
toral districts in judicial elections 
through narrowly interpreting Section 
2 of the Voters' Rights Act of 1965. 
Masson brought a libel action 
against Malcolm, New Yorker Maga-
zine, and Alfred Knopf, Inc. under 
California libel law in the United 
States District Court for the Northern 
District of California. The parties 
agreed that Masson was a public fig-
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